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1 Introduction
To deal with the transfer payment problem Radner [4] introduced a proﬁt-center
game, and Ichiishi and Radner [2] extended it toward the incomplete information
situation. Ichiishi and Radner [2] proved that the nonemptiness of the ex ante
Bayesian incentive compatible core in three interesting cases. But their proof for
the case of increasing-returns-to-scale technology is much involved and excludes
I am extremely grateful to Tatsuro Ichiishi for his advice and encouragement.
1nonmarketed intermediate commodity. In this paper, the simple proof of the ex-
istence theorem for a full-information revealing core plan in a proﬁt-center game
with incomplete information and increasing returns to scale is given. It does not
exclude nonmarketed intermediate commodities.
A proﬁt-center game is a speciﬁc case of a strategic cooperative game with
incomplete information. Several types of information revealtion process are con-
sidered in this framework. Here, we use information revealtion process called by
executing contract developed by Ichiishi, Idzik, and Zhao [1]. Vohra [7] deals
with another information revealtion proceess called mediator based approach in
the framework of a Bayesian pure exchange economy. For further discussion, see
Ichiishi and Yamazaki [3].
2 A Proﬁt-Center Game with Incomplete Informa-
tion
Let K be the set of commodities. A generic element is a 2 K. We denote the
cardinality of K by k, so there are k commodities in the world. Assume that the
commodity space is Rk
+. The set of commodities K is divided into two categories
Km and Kn. A commoditiy a 2 Km is called marketed commodity. A marketed
commodity can be bought or sold on markets. So a marketed commodity a 2
Km has a market price pa. The market price vector for marketed commodities is
denoted by p  0. On the other hand, a commodity in Kn is called nonmarketed
commodity. A nonmarketed commodity is owned or produced in the ﬁrm and used
only internally; thus it has no market price. We denote the number of marketed
commodities (resp. nonmarketed commodity) by km (resp. kn). Of course, k =
km + kn.
A ﬁrm consists of ﬁnitely many porﬁt-centers, that is divisions. Let N be
the ﬁnite set of divisions. Each divison is considered as an independent decision
maker. A division j is characterized by exogenously given data fT j;(Y j;rj())g,
where T j is a ﬁnite set of types, whose generic element is tj, Y j is a production
possibility set, and rj : T j ! Rk
+ is a resource function. In this model, a type
tj 2 T j is interpreted as asset speciﬁty of division j.
For any S 2 N := 2N nf;g, we denote the set of type proﬁles TS := j2ST j. In
particular, for grand coalition N, T := T N. Notice that Y j  RkjTj. We also deﬁne
YS := j2SY j. By abuse of notation, rj := rj(T j).
Let  be the ex ante probability distribution on T. We assume that  is a
2product probability of j, j 2 N, where j is a probability on T j; for simplicity,
j  0. We also assume that (j)j2N is common knowledge.










A porﬁt-center game with incomplete information D is played as follows. In
ex ante stage, which no division knows the true type of any division, several di-
visions form a coalition and agree on their proﬁt imputation plan and net output
plan. A proﬁt imputation plan of a coalition S is a type dependent proﬁt imputa-
tion xS : T ! RS;t 7! xS(t), where xS := (xj)j2S. An intended interpretaion is
xj(t) is a proﬁt imputation of division j, given a type proﬁle t 2 T. A net output
plan yS : T ! Rk#S is similarly deﬁned. We call a pair (xS;yS) a plan.
Once the grand coalition N decide on a plan1 (xN;yN), the game proceeds
interim stage, i.e., the nature reveals to division j that true type is ¯ tj. Notice
that in this stage ¯ tj is j’s private information. In this stage, the plan is executed.
However, since the type is private information, division j may have incentive to
misrepresent its true type as ˜ tj (instead of ¯ tj). If the plan had left such incentives,
the member of N would not have agree on (xN;yN) from the beginning. They must
have agreed on an incentive-compatible plan in the ex ante stage. As a result, the
plan is truthfully executed.
To deﬁne the incentive comapatibility precisely, we take the approach devel-
oped by Ichiishi, idzik and Zhao [1]. We postulate that the interim stage is divided
into two period and the set of commodities K is partitioned into fK1;K2g. The ﬁrst
interim period is called the setup period and the second interim period the manu-
fucturing period.
For any net output plan yS, we deﬁne (yS
1;yS
2) := yS, where yS
i correspond to
Ki. In the ﬁrst interim period, yN
1 is executed and in the second interim period, yN
2
and xN are executed.
Now we are ready for formal analysis. To begin with, we deﬁne the techno-
logical attainabilty. For any coalition S, (xS;yS) : T ! R1+k is technologically
























1It is easy to extend the equilibrium concept to allow for realization of a coaliton structure.
3The set of techonologically attainable plan for coalition S is denoted by FS.
Next, we deﬁne the measurability condition of a strategy, which is called the
allowability. In the setup period, any types are private information, so y
j
1 must
be measurable with respect to his private information. In the manufucturing pe-
riod, however, more information can be used because information is revealed by
executing yS
1. Suppose the true types are ¯ tS and the coordinated starategy yS
1 is
executed truthfully. Then, it is natural postulate that in the manufucturing period
all divisions know that true types are in (yS
1) 1(yS
1(¯ tS)).
Let T j be the algebra generated by the partition fftjg  T Nnfjggtj2T j on T, and
A(y
j
1) be the algebra generated by a function y
j
1 on T. Deﬁne T j(yS









1 is T j-measurable;
(ii) (xj;y
j
2) is T j(yS
1)-measurable.
The set of allowable plan for coalition S is denoted by F0S.
Postulate 1 (Information-Pooling Rule). The member of coalition S can design
only allowable plans.
Even if (xS;yS) is allowable, there may be a division which has an incentive
to represent a false type. Hence, we require the Bayesian incentive compatibility
as a feasibility condition of a coordinated strategy. Suppose yS be agreed upon
in a coalition S. In the setup period, since each division’s type is a private in-
formation, divison j 2 S can choose ˆ y
j
1 2 yj(T j) arbitrarily; however this choice
restricts the action in the manufucturing period. By the information-pooling rule,














2 ) and ˆ y
Snfjg
2 is S n fjg’s choice in the setup period. The
Bayesian incentive compatibility is the condition that no division in S has a incen-
tive to misrepresent its type in the above restriction.
Postulate 2 (Bayesian Incentive Compatibility). The member of a coalition S
can design only Bayesian incentive-compatible plans.
The formal deﬁnition of the Bayesian incentive compatibility is a bit involved;
seeIchiishiand Radner[2] forthedetail. Wedenoteby ˆ FS theBayesianincentive-
compatible plan for coalition S.
The Bayesian incentive compatibility is too stringent to gurantee the existence
of equilibrium plan. Hence, we elaborate on a role of headquarters. The grand
4coalition has the headquarters as its member, so can count on the latter’s ability
to insure monetary gain or loss. Therefore, it can adopt plans outside FN, as long
as they can be insured. A plan (xS;yS) 2 F
0S is called weakly Bayesian incentive-
compatible if for all j 2 S, and all ¯ tj; ˜ tj 2 T j, it follows that
E(x
j j ¯ t
j)  E(x
j  (˜ t
j;id) j ˜ t
j):
It is easy to show that if (xS;yS) is weakly Bayesian incentive-compatible, then
E(xj j T j) is a constant fuction. So, if the headquaters is risk-neutral, then the
following postulate is justiﬁed.
Postulate 3 (Headquater’s Insurability). Let (xN;yN) be the allowable plan and
E(xj j T j) is a constant function for each j 2 N. Then the plan ((E(xj j T j))j2N;yN)
is avaiable to the grand coalition N.
Let HN be the set of plans satisﬁes the above condition. It is known that if
(xN;yN) is technologically attainable and yN satisﬁes the information-pooling rule,
and E(xj jT j)isaconstantfunctionforeach j 2 N, thentheplan((E(xj jT j))j2N;yN)
is Bayesian incentive-compatible. Thus, headquater’s insurability is consistent
with the other postulates. In the light of this postulate, we can deﬁne the set of






ˆ FS; if S , N
ˆ FN [ HN; if S = N:
We are going to deﬁne a solution of the porﬁt-center game (a speciﬁc strategic
cooperative game): it is a core plan.
Deﬁnition 2. (xN;yN) 2 ˆ FN is an ex ante core plan of a porﬁt-center game with
incomplete information D if it is not true that
9S 2 N : 9(x
S;y
S) 2 ˆ F




2 ) is T N-measurable, then we call (xN;yN) an ex ante full-information
revealing core plan.
There are two basic assumption that gurantees the existence of a core plan.
Assumtion 1 (Basic Assumptions on the Production Sets). For each coalition




5(ii) The production set Y j is closed in RkjTj for each j 2 N;
(iii) 0 2 Y j for each j 2 N;
(iv) Y j   R
kjtj
+  Y j for each j 2 N;
(v) for each y
j












is bounded from above.
Assumption 1 (ii)-(v) are standard. Assumption 1 (i) implies that there are no
external economies. It is not dicult to extend our results to the case of existence
of external economies.
Assumtion 2 (Basic Assumptions on the Resource Functions).
(i) K1n , ;;
(ii) the resource function r
j
1 is 1-1 on T j;
(iii) rj(tj)  0, for all tj 2 T j.
Assumption2(ii)playsacrucialroletoensuretheexistenceoffull-information
revealing core plans.
Ichiishi and Radner [2] established three types of core existence theorem. To
prove our theorem, we need their ﬁrst theorem (existence theorem under a convex
production possibility set).
Theorem 1 (Ichiishi and Radner). Let D be a porﬁt-center game with incom-
plete information which satisﬁes Postulate 1-3 and Assumption1, 2. Assume more-
over that Y j is convex for any j 2 N. Then there exists a full-information revealing
core plan of the game.
3 Distributive Production Sets
The main result of this paper is that an ex ante core plan exists even if the pro-
duction possibility set exhibits increasing returns to scale. Ichiishi and Radner
[2]’s second theorem addressed the nonemptiness of the core given an increasing-
returns-to-scale technology, but had to exclude an intermediate commodity. Our
main theorem, on the other hand, overcomes this shortcoming and indeed allows
for presence of intermediate commodities. To state the condition which guran-
tees the existence of core plan, we introduce the ideas of nonmarketed princi-
pal commodity and distributive technology. A nonmarketed commodity which
6is only used as input is called nonmarketed principal commodity. The set of
nonmarketed principal commodity is denoted by Knp. Let knp := #Knp. Deﬁne
 := R(k knp)jTj  ( R
knpjTj
+ ). By the deﬁnition of nonmarketed principal commod-
ity, a production possibility set saﬁsﬁes the following condition:
Y
j   
for any j 2 N. A commodity a 2 Kn n Knp can be a nonmarketed intermediate
commodity.
Next, we deﬁne the distributiveness of a production possibility set. This idea
is introduced by Scarf [5].
Deﬁnition 3. Let Y j be a production possibility set which satisﬁes basic assump-
tion on production set. The set Y j is called distributive if for any ﬁnite number
of points yi 2 Y j, and any non-negative i, the point y =
P
iyiis also in Y j, if y
satisﬁes the conditions yi   y 2 .
Notice that if Y j is distributive, then Y j exhibits nondecreasing returns to scale.
See Sharkey [6] for a clear presentation of the distributiveness concept.
Assumtion 3 (Distributiveness of the Total Production Possibility Set).
(i) Knp , ;.
(ii) Y(N) is distributive.
Assumputin 3 (i) is a mild one. Indeed, as an example of a nonmarketed
principal commodity, consider a human capital.
Theorem 2 (Scarf). Let Y be a distributive set and let  < Y.Then, there is a
nonnegative vector  such that
   > 0 and;
  y  0 for any y 2 Y \ [ + ]:
Now, we can estabilsh our main theorem. The proof uses quite similar logic
as Scarf [5, Theorem 6], the existence theorem for the social equilibrium of a
production economy with the distributive production possibility set.
Theorem 3. Let D be a porﬁt-center game with incomplete information which
satisﬁes Postulate 1-3 and Assumption 1-3. Assume moreover that
P
j2N rj(tj)  0
for any t 2 T. Then there exists a full-information revealing core plan of the game.
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Consider the porﬁt-center game D0 which is the same as D except that each di-
vison has an identical production possibility set ˆ Y. Since ˆ Y is convex, there is a
full-information revealing core plan (xN;yN) of D0. By the construction of ˆ Y, if
yN 2 YN, then then (xN;yN) is a full-information revealing core plan of D.
Let y :=
P
j2N yj. Then yN 2 YN is equivalent to y 2 Y(N). (Remember
Y(N) =
P
j2N Y j.) Suppose y < Y(N). By the distributiveness of Y(N) and
theorem 2, there is a nonnegative vector  such that
  y
 > 0 and;












7 7 7 7 7 7 5
By the second inequality and the deﬁnition of ˆ Y, for any y 2 ˆ Y,   y  0; in
particular,   y  0— a contradiction.

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